THE EFFECT OF MEASURES SHORT
OF WAR ON TREATIES*
ROBERT LAYTONt
N JANUARY 3, 1961, President Eisenhower instructed his Secretary of

State to deliver a note to the Charg6 d'Affaires ad interim of Cuba in
Washington, which stated that the Government of the United States
hereby formally terminated diplomatic and consular relations with the Government of Cuba.1 The next day White House Press Secretary Hagerty stated
in a release that: "The termination of our diplomatic and consular relations
with Cuba has no effect on the status of our naval station at Guantanamo.
The treaty rights under which we maintain the naval station may not be
abrogated without the consent of the United States." 2
The concern demonstrated by the Government of the United States over the
effect that a severance of diplomatic relations could have on its treaty rights
vividly illustrates one of the uncertainties of public international law in a
period when hostilities rarely take the form of traditional warfare. The course
of the Cold War may cast doubt on the validity of some international agreements in such a way as to provide either the grounds, or the excuse, for the
outbreak of full-scale hostilities. However, the adoption of the Charter of the
United Nations and the evolution of a "new international law" can play a
role in clarifying the effect of modern hostilities on treaties in the absence of
a state of war.
For many years resort to force has tended to fall short of that state technically recognized as war. 3 To some extent this is true because of more recent
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I See 44 DEP'T. STATE BuLL. 103 (1961).

2 Ibid.

3 See generally HINDMARsH, FORCE IN PEACE (1933); WIGHT, LEGAL PROBLEMS IN THE
FAR EASTERN CoNrLicT 92 (1941), where it is noted that: "During the twentieth century
most states accepted legal obligations not to resort to war, or, in some cases, not to use
armed force for the solution of international controversies. As a consequence, states, while
continuing to resort to the use of armed force, have been reluctant to acknowledge that

they are resorting to war."
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efforts in the international community to outlaw war as an acceptable means
of implementing national policy. 4 This is reflected in the evolution of a terminology based on perpetuation of a continued state of peace. 5 It must be
realized, however, that while the terminology applicable to the resort to force
has changed, the intensity of coercive forces being employed in the international community may not have diminished at all. Nevertheless, in view of
the present movement away from a war-peace dichotomy, it is necessary to
examine the effects of a resort to force in time of technical peace upon a
variety of legal relationships. 6 This article attempts to analyze the effects of

the use of measures short of war upon treaty obligations between nations.
I. Tim NATURE OF THE PROBLEM

Over many years international law developed clear concepts of the legal
effects produced upon the outbreak and termination of war. Originally it was
thought that the outbreak of war ipso facto abrogated all treaty obligations
between opposing belligerents, with only a few clearly defined exceptions. 7
The rationale for this doctrine apparently was the belief that the existence of
a state of war between two or more states was logically incompatible with the
4 While the restrictions and prohibitions imposed by the Covenant of the League of
Nations were limited to resort to war, they left open the question of resort to force short of
war. 2 OPPEms, INTERNATIONAL LAW 152 (7th ed. Lauterpacht 1952) (hereinafter cited as
OPPENHEI); H NDMARSH, op. cit. supra note 3, at 111-44; McNair, The Legal Meaning of
War, and the Relation of War to Reprisals, 11 TRANSACT. GROT. Soc'Y 39, 40-46 (1927).
The Charter of the United Nations clearly proscribes recourse to force short of war:

"Article 2(3). All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in
such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered.
"Article 2(4). All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat
or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in
any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations."
Significantly, the Charter applies this duty to refrain from the use of force to States not
Members of the Organization (art. 2, 6).

5 GROB, TBE RELATIvrTY OF WAR AND PEACE 189 (1949); HINDMARSH, op. cit. supra

note 3, at 90-91. For an examination of the controversy concerning determination of the
point in time when a legal state of war may be said to exist, see McDougal & Feliciano,
The Initiation of Coercion: A Multi-Temporal Analysis, 52 AM. J. INT'L L. 241 (1958).
6 See Jsssur, A MODERN LAW OF NATIONS 152 (1948): "In a well-organized world system

operating under a modernized law of nations, war in its old sense will no longer escape legal
regulation, and the consequences of war upon treaties as well as upon other legal relationships would stand in need of redefinition." HNDMARSH, op. cit. supra note 3, at 92, notes:
"Since warlike acts do not, under prevailing international law, necessarily produce a state
of war, it is important to examine the criteria by which the use of force in time of peace has
been differentiated from war." See also, WRIGHT, op. cit. supra note 3, at 92.
7 McNAmR, THE LAW OF TREATIES, BRms- PRACTICE AND OPINION 530-52 (1938);
2 HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW, CHIEFLY AS INTERPRETED AND APPLIED BY THE UNITED STATES

§ 547 (1945) (hereinafter cited as HYDE); 2 VATTEL, LE DROIT DES GENS, bk. II, ch. XII,
§§ 153, 192 (1916 ed.); 3 PHILLIMORE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 794 (3rd ed. 1882); Harvard
Research in International Law, Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties with Comment, 29
AM. J. INT'L L. 1184 (Supp. 1935) (hereinafter cited as Harvard Research); Comment, Effect
of War on BilateralTreaties: A ComparativeStudy, 51 MIcH. L. REv. 566 (1953); 5 MooRE,
DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW § 779 (1906).
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maintenance of their treaties. Over the years the exceptions to the doctrine
have expanded to the point where it may be said that the outbreak of war
does not necessarily terminate treaty obligations.9 This development resulted

from the increased interdependence and interrelationship of states, which
would be continually upset by a concept of automatic abrogation, and from

the realization by decision-makers that there is no necessary incompatibility
between the existence of a state of war and the suspension or even the performance of certain types of obligations.10
Some writers have assumed that resort to force short of war has little, if
any, effect upon treaty obligations,"1 and that this phenomenon constitutes
one of the advantages of the use of such measures. There is room for re-appraisal of this assumption.
For present purposes the phrase "measures short of war" includes that category of international processes whereby states, in order to settle their international differences, use varying degrees of coercion, ranging from withdrawal of diplomatic relations, retortion or retaliation, and the display of
force, to war-like acts such as reprisals, blockades, embargoes, suspensions of
commercial intercourse and, finally, the extensive use of armed forces without

formal declaration of war.12

8 Harvard Research 1185. Comment, supranote 7, at 566. The absence of any causal connection between the two events is suggested in 2 HYDE 1547.
9 See McINTYRE, THE LEGAL EFrscT OF WORLD WAR II ON TREATIES OF THE UNITED
STATES 340 (1958) (hereinafter cited as McINTYRE), where it is concluded that: "There is no
instance in which the evidence is conclusive that the United States regarded any treaty as
terminated by World War II." See McNAm, TaE LAW OF TREATIES 530-32 (1938); Hurst,
The Effect of War on Treaties,2 BrT. YB. INT'L L. 38 (1921-22); 2 OPPENHmM 302; 2 HYDE
1546-47; TOBIN, TMHE TEtMINATION OF MuLTIPARTITE TREATIES 22 (1933); Harvard Research
1185; BIGGS, THE LAW OF NATIONS 942 (2d ed. 1952).
10 Harvard Research 1185-86. Judge Cardozo, in applying his principle "that provisions
compatible with a state of hostilities, unless expressly terminated, will be enforced, and
those incompatible rejected," looked to three factors in order to determine compatibility:
(1) the policy of the government; (2) the safety of the nation; and (3) the maintenance of the
war. Techt v. Hughes, 229 N.Y. 222, 241, 128 N.E. 185, 191, cert. denied, 254 U.S. 643
(1920).
11
HINDMA1SH, op. cit. supra note 3, at 96: "The occurrence of warlike acts in time of
peace is paradoxical and leads to contrary situations. Execution of such measures is governed
by restraining rules of war so far as those rules are deemed applicable by the enforcing state.
In practice persons have not been detained and private property has rarely been confiscated.
Diplomatic relations between the disputant states usually continue; treaties remain in force,
and trade, commerce, and communication between the disputant states are allowed to
continue." Id. at 87-88: "It was stated that reprisals, being limited in scope, were less
likely than war seriously to affect international relations .... Again, resort to reprisals does
not terminate existing treaties, does not affect private interests beyond the scene of operations, and raises no questions of neutral rights and duties."
12 Various descriptive tags have been applied to these processes by writers, with only
minor differences as to subjects which are included and excluded. Professor Hyde uses the
phrase "non-amicable modes of redress," and includes withdrawal of diplomatic relations
and suspension of commercial intercourse. 2 HYDE, §§ 586-595A. See also 6 HAcKWORTH,
DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 151 (1943). Sir Hersch Lauterpacht excluded these subjects
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The question is the extent to which the rules governing the effect of war
apply to measures short of war. In seeking an answer, it will be necessary to
examine those situations where in the past some concern has been manifested
by the authorities of the states involved, through diplomatic correspondence,
executive acts, legislative debates or court decisions. In addition, it may prove
useful, as giving rise to a negative inference, to note those situations where
hostilities took place, but no concern over possible effects on treaties was
shown and performance of obligations continued unaffected.
In general, the effect of international incidents upon treaties may be said
to be determined by the actions of the executive within a particular government, 13 with some light being shed by the activities of the legislature. On the
whole, the role of the courts in this sphere has been slight.14 At the same time,
it may be noted that the executive branch of a government is reluctant to state
its position in legal terms since an unnecessarily definite position may prove
embarrassing at a later time under changed conditions.15
In approaching the problem it will be useful first to examine briefly the
attitude of states prior to formation of the League of Nations. Consideration
will then be given to the effect of the Covenant, to episodes during the life of
the League, and most important for practical reasons, to the situation created
by the adoption of the Charter of the United Nations. No attempt will be
made to examine all instances of the use of measures short of war.
II. TBE PERIOD PRIOR TO THE LEAGuE
For many years international law provided rules for the use of lesser measures of force by a state attempting to secure compliance with the alleged
international obligations of a weaker state.1 6 The extent to which the measures
by employing the phrase "compulsive settlement of state differences." 2 OPPENrENmt 133;
see BRIGGS, op. cit. supra note 9, at 947 (hostile measures short of war). An observation of
Professor Moore is noteworthy: "In describing these measures as being 'short of war' it is
not meant that they do not involve acts of war. What is actually meant is that, if not opposed,
they may not result in the legal condition of things called a state of war." Letter to Hon.
Hamilton Fish, M.C., N.Y. Times, Feb. 18, 1937, p. 16, quoted in 2 HYDE 1654.
13 McIntyre has said that: "the trend of the recent jurisprudence is for the courts to rely
upon the determination of the executive in cases involving the effect of war on treaties."
McINTYRE 2. The English courts "have consistently from early times adhered to the view
that war is a matter peculiarly within the prerogative of the Crown, and that they ought to
look to the Crown to give some indication of the existence of war, as indeed it usually does,
by proclamation." McNair, supra note 4, at 29. See Techt v. Hughes, 229 N.Y. 222, 128
N.E. 185 (1920).
14 As to the effect of war and hostilities in general, it has been observed that, "Court decisions in point are few and usually deal with the question of the effect of the agreement as
domestic law, rather than with the question of the status of the agreement under international law." REsrATEMENT, FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 142, comment a (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1959).
15 MCINTYRE 2.

16 See JEssup, op. cit. supra note 6, at 158, 174. Cf. U.S. NAvAL WAR COLLEGE, INTERNATIONAL LAW SrruATIoNs, 56, 57, 60-62, 85 (1938).
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of that day-reprisal, siege, pacific blockade-affected treaties, was related to
the need to take such actions in order to preserve the state itself. Legal form
was given to such actions by reference to the concept of "emergency," which
temporarily suspended the obligation of the treaty.17
The "pacific" blockade of Venezuelan ports in 1902 affords a representative
example. As the result of the refusal of the Venezuelan Government to pay
reparations for a series of seizures of British ships, injuries to British subjectslS
and unpaid commercial claims to several nations, Great Britain joined Germany and Italy in seizing several Venezuelan warships and shelling two forts,19
and then, on the failure of these efforts, in the institution of a blockade. More
than a year later, agreements were concluded for payment of the claims of the
blockading powers, and the blockade was raised. 20 Although no declaration
of war was made, considerable doubt existed at the time as to whether the
entire situation constituted a state of war. Later commentators have also disagreed on the question. 2 ' Article VII of the protocol between Great Britain
and Venezuela resolved the matter as follows:
The Venezuelan and British Governments agree that, inasmuch as it
may be contended that the establishment of a blockade of Venezuelan ports
by the British naval forces has ipso facto created a state of war between
Venezuela and Great Britain, and that any treaty existing between the two
countries has been thereby abrogated, it shall be recorded in an exchange
of notes between the undersigned that the Convention between Venezuela
and Great Britain of October 29, 1834, which adopted and confirmed
mutatis mutandis the treaty of April 18, 1825, between Great Britain and
the State of Colombia, shall be deemed to be renewed and confirmed or provisionally renewed and confirmed pending conclusion of a new treaty of
Amity and Commerce. 22
17 See, for example, the language used by British legal advisers in referring to this
concept on various occasions during the first half of the nineteenth century: Report
by the King's Advocate, February 6, 1835 (concerning the right of British vessels to enter
certain blockaded Spanish ports), reprinted in McNAm, THE LAW OF TREATES 234 (1938);
Report by the Queen's Advocate, December 31, 1845 (travel restrictions imposed on British
subjects not to return to site of siege), reprinted, id. at 237; Report by the Queen's Advocate,
January 10, 1863 (search of houses of British subjects in time of siege), reprinted, id. at 23839; Report by the Queen's Advocate, August 29, 1866 (prohibition of exports during famine
despite agreements) reprinted, id. at 239-40.
18 For details, see HOGAN, PACIFC BLOCKADE 149-152 (1908); for background correspondence, see British Parliamentary Papers, Cd. 1372 (1902), Cd. 1399 (1903).
19 Id. Cd. 1399 (1903), at 167.
20 February 13, 1903. Id. at 225-27; HOGAN, op. cit. supra note 18, at 155-56.
212 HYDE § 592, at 1669; 2 OPPENIEIM 146, n.1; Holland, War Sub Modo, 19 L.Q. REv.
133 (1903); HOGAN, op. cit. supra note 18, at 156-57; see also McNAiR, THE LAW OF TREATiEs 536 (1938).
22 Brit. Parl. Papers, Cd. 1399 (1903), at 226-27; RALSTON, VENEzULAN ARBrrATiON

OF 1903, at 293 (1904).
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The ensuing Exchange of Notes, 23 employing language almost identical to
that of the protocol, explained that under the circumstances the treaty in question "shall be deemed to be renewed and confirmed."
Apparently Great Britain was concerned that the occurrence of these hostilities, not dignified by the formal status of war, might give Venezuela the
opportunity to seize upon the then accepted principle that war abrogates all
treaties in order to avoid the obligations of the 1834 commercial agreement. 24
Whatever their reasoning, the parties undoubtedly recognized that the blockade might be said to have affected the treaty. The later decision of the Permanent Court of Arbitration on the claims of the blockading powers for preferential treatment in the payment of claims by Venezuela avoided ruling on the
legal status of the hostilities, used conflicting terminology in describing their
nature, and unfortunately is not helpful in ascertaining what effect, if any, the
hostilities had upon prior treaties. 25 The treaty of 1834 between Great Britain
and Venezuela appears still to be considered in force between the parties. 2 6

III. EFFECT OF MEASURES SHORT OF WAR
DURING THE PERIOD OF THE LEAGUE

The actions of a state that initiates hostilities will produce certain results
on its relations with the state against which the action is taken and also upon
third states. However, with the organization of the world community the
problem of the effects on treaties produced by hostile acts acquires a new dimension: The international organization becomes entitled, once it decides the
hostilities are of a defined nature, to employ economic and military sanctions,
which may affect any number of existing treaty relationships.
A. Machinery of the League.--The machinery provided by the Covenant
of the League of Nations for the application of organized measures short of
war to a Covenant-breaking state was contained in Article 16. This article,
and the major design of the entire Covenant, was keyed to the unfortunate 27
touchstone of a "resort to war" in the contemporary context of the meaning
of that phrase. Although it was expected that a centralized decision by the
23

Reprinted in McNAm, THE LAW OF TREATiEs 537 (1938).

24

In each of the years 1841, 1843, 1879 and 1897, the Government of Venezuela had
notified Great Britain that it wished to terminate the Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation, which it had adopted in 1834. McNAm, THE LAW OF TREATiEs 366-67 (1938). On
each occasion the British Government declined to accept such unilateral termination.
25 In this award, the following characterizations were given to the blockade and hostilities: "military operations," "war," "warlike operations." Award of the Tribunal of ArbitrationBetween Germany, Great Britain,andItaly, on the One Hand,and Venezuela on the Other
Hand, Cmd. No. 1949 (1904).
26

LisT OF

TREATiEs, ETc., RELATiNG TO COMMERCE AND NAVIGATION BETwEEN GREAT

BRITAIN AND FOREIGN PowERs 38 (1927).

27 HINDMARSH, op. cit. supra note 3, at 138, 157.
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Council of the League would be made to determine the proper application
of the article, the Assembly early adopted a resolution stating:
It is the duty of each Member of the League to decide for itself whether
a breach of the Covenant has been committed. The fulfilment of their
duties under Article 16 is required from Members of the League by the
express terms of the Covenant, and they cannot neglect them without
28
breach of their treaty obligations.
For a variety of reasons the League's machinery for application of the col-

lective economic sanctions under Article 16 against a nation employing
armed force was not used on the occurrence of major instances of resort to
force short of war, i.e., the Italian bombardment of Corfu in 1923, the GrecoBulgarian disturbance of 1925, and the Sino-Japanese hostilities of the thirties. 29 There was sufficient concern in the League over the legality of using
the economic sanctions of Article 16 during a period of technical peace for the
Council to request the opinion of its Secretary General. His report concluded
that the Covenant contemplated the use of collective economic and military
sanctions without requiring a declaration of war or even without being incon30
sistent with a state of peace.
In upholding the duty of a League member, once it considers Article 16
to be applicable, to take action against the aggressor and also to "recognize
the lawfulness of measures of economic pressure taken.., by other Members
of the League," 31 the report noted that:
As regards the possible effect of treaty stipulations between Members
of the League, more particularly stipulations of transit conventions and
conventions establishing international unions or other methods of international cooperation by which in time of peace a Member of the League is
bound to facilitate intercourse between another Member and the aggressor
State, it may be pointed out that the clear intention of the Covenant is that
its provisions shall not be defeated by those of other treaties (Article 20).32
28 Resolutions Regarding the Economic Weapon, Adopted by the Assembly on October 4,
1921, Annexes I, LEAGUE OF NATIONS On. 3. (pt. 11) 8th Ass. 840 (C.2411/M.116) (1927).
29
In connection with the Corfu incident, the League Council questioned a special committee of jurists for an opinion: "The answer given by the Special Committee of jurists to
the question of the compatibility of measures short of war with the terms of the Covenant
was diffuse and noncommittal. In effect, it made the legality of such measures depend on the
particular circumstances of each case and left it to the Council to determine in each case the
issue after the fact." HNDMARSH, op. cit. supra note 3, at 135.
30 Report by the Secretary General, LegalPositionArising from the Enforcement in Time
of Peace of the Measures of Economic PressureIndicatedin Article 16 of the Covenant, Particularly by a Maritime Blockade, LEAGUE OF NATIONS OFF.J., (pt. 1) 8th Ass. 834 (C. 2411/
M.116) (1927).
31 "The conclusion is that strict application of the economic sanctions of the article without resort to war is possible without violating legal rights of the Members applying the
sanctions or (probably) of Members which do not consider the Covenant to have been
broken." Id. at 836.
32 Ibid.

MEASURES SHORT OF WAR

1962

Article 20, referred to as authority for the subordination of pre-existing
treaties to obligations under the Covenant, reads as follows:
1. The Members of the League severally agree that this Covenant is accepted as abrogating all obligations or understandings inter se which are
inconsistent with the terms thereof, and solemnly undertake that they will
not hereafter enter into any engagements inconsistent with the terms
thereof.
2. In case any Member of the League shall, before becoming a Member
of the League, have undertaken any obligation inconsistent with the terms
of this Covenant, it shall be the duty of such Member to take immediate
33
steps to procure its release from such obligations.
The use of the term "abrogate" is significant. It may be inferred from its use,
and the citation of Article 20 in connection with the invocation of the sanctions of Article 16, that as each member state considers the casusfoederisto
have arisen, those treaties between it and the aggressor state, and those between any other member and the aggressor, which are inconsistent with enforcement of the sanctions are ipso facto terminated. Particular attention was
called to transit conventions or other treaties which could be relied upon to
aid the movement of troops and supplies to the aggressor.
The major practical difficulty in applying these prescriptions was the determination of which obligations were inconsistent with sanctions under Article
16. Once the formula of leaving such matters to the decision of individual
members was employed, the effectiveness of the entire scheme was weakened.
One may speculate that the choice of the abrogation formula by the architects
of the Covenant was influenced by the prevalence at that time of the older doctrine that war-and the machinery of the League was keyed to the concept of
war-abrogated most treaties.
As to states not members of the League, and bound only by the ordinary
rules of international law, the report expressed doubt whether these were
under a legal obligation to acquiesce in the implementation of the sanctions
under Article 16, but hoped that they would take a "benevolent attitude" toward the policy of members, and suggested they would be incurring a great
moral responsibility if they frustrated such efforts. 34 The non-membership of
such powerful states as the United States and Soviet Russia in the League
35
may have been a factor in this extremely cautious approach.
B. State-InitiatedMeasures Short of War Under the League.-During the
period of the League, several major instances of armed hostilities occurred;
however, only two-the Italo-Ethopian and the Sino-Japanese "wars"--will
be examined here. To varying degrees the League attempted to deal with, or
33 Comparable
34
35

to U.N. CHARTm art. 103.
Report by the Secretary-General, supra note 30, at 837.
For definition of "third States" see ibid.

104

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30:96

ignored, these outbreaks. Finally, the approach of World War II came at a
time when the League was, for most practical purposes, defunct.
1. Italy v. Ethiopia.-Between 1900 and 1908, Italy and Ethiopia had concluded various treaties defining the frontiers between Ethiopia and the Italian
colonies as well as the status of Italian nationals and protected persons in
Ethiopia. 36 Further, Italy had entered into numerous treaties with Britain and
France demarking respective spheres of influence in Ethiopia.37 Ethiopia was
unanimously admitted to the League in 1923 with Italy's support. In 1928,
Italy and Ethiopia signed a treaty designed to maintain peace and friendship
between the two countries and providing for arbitration of any disputes; and
in 1930, Britain and France joined with them in a treaty for the regulation of
arms importation into Ethiopia.38
In October of 1935, military hostilities broke out between Italy and Ethiopia. A committee of the League Council found that "the Italian Government
has resorted to war in disregard of its covenants under Article 12 of the Covenant of the League of Nations," 39 and upon the invocation by Ethiopia of
Article 16, a Co-ordination Committee was formed to direct the imposition of
economic sanctions against Italy. 40 This Committee instituted a complex of
sanctions against Italy to be carried out by League members, among which
were (1) an arms embargo, (2) a credit embargo, (3) an import boycott and
(4) an export embargo on certain key products. 41 The Committee further recommended that co-operating members increase their imports in favor of countries which suffered by loss of Italian markets and that they assist generally in
organization of the international marketing of goods with a view to offsetting
any loss of Italian markets that the application of sanctions may have involved. 42
36

Treaty of July 10, 1900, TRArrAn E CoNvENzIoNE rA IL REGNO D'ITALWA E GLI
ALTRE STATIE, V. 16, p. 184 (1899-1902); Anglo-Ethiopian Treaty of May 15, 1902, Cmd
No. 1370 (1902 CXXX 397); Convention of May 6, 1908, TRATrATi E. CONVENZIONE FRA
IL REGNO D'ITALiA E. Gu ALTRE STATm, V. 20-21, p. 32 (1908-11); Franco-Ethiopian Treaty of January 10, 1908 (Klobukowski Treaty). See Official Documents, 30-31 Supp. Am. J.

INT'L L. 17 (1936-37).
3
7 Italo-British Protocols of March 24, 1891, April 15, 1891, Cmd. No. 5924 (1890-91
LXXXI, 749); Italo-Franco-British Agreement, December 13, 1906, Cmd. No. 3299 (1907
XCIX 309); Italo-British Exchange of Notes, December 1925, Cmd. No. 2472 (1924-25

XXX 643); Franco-Italian Agreement of January 7, 1935. See Official Documents, supra
note 41, at 17-18.
38 See Official Documents, supra note 41, at 21-22.
39
Declaration of Nine Power Conference, LEAGUE Op NAnONS Doc. A. 78. VII, 7-9

(1935).
40 The Council Report stated, 'it is not necessary that war should have been formally
declared for Article 16 to be applicable." On October 5, 1935, the President of the United
States had recognized war as existing for the purpose of applying the Neutrality Act of
August 31, 1935. 2 OPPEN-mim 152.

41 Official Documents, supranote 41, at 42-46.
42 d. at 47.
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A legal subcommittee submitted a report on the application of sanctions
to private contracts, commercial treaties, treaties of friendship and non-aggression, and the most-favored-nation clause. The report contained certain
significant conclusions: (1) an action brought by an Italian on a contract with
a national of a sanction-participating state for non-performance would fail in
the courts of that state; and if brought in an Italian court, any judgment could
not be executed in the defendant's country since to do so would override the
effect of Article 16; (2) the non-performance of a commercial treaty with
Italy would give Italy no legal rights; however, Italy would not have the right
to withhold performance of her obligations under a treaty or to annul or suspend the performance of contracts in process since the Covenant-by virtue
of which the sanctions were taken-bound both Italy and League members;
(3) the application of economic and financial sanctions against Italy by a
party to a treaty of friendship and non-aggression which provides against
participation in any international entente preventing purchase or sales of
goods or granting of credits would not violate such a treaty since the contracting parties were members of the League and their agreements were subject to
Articles 16 and 20 of the Covenant; (4) similarly, the most-favored-nation
clause was interpreted so as not to deprive co-operating states of benefits they
would receive had sanctions not been imposed against Italy.4 3 As to the conflicting obligations created by transit or communications conventions previously concluded with states not members of the League, the subcommittee
reasoned that "the League is entitled to hold that no individual member can
release itself from the obligations which result from Article 16 of the Covenant
by invoking obligations assumed towards a country not belonging to the
League." 44 The sanction-participating states further agreed to consider those
agreements under which Italy owed debts payable to them as valid and only
temporarily suspended. 45
2. Japan v. China.-The Sino-Japanese hostilities of the thirties took place
against a background of multilateral political alliances which were designed
to preserve a political status quo and prevent the very occurrences which
transpired. For their own reasons the opposing belligerents refused to admit
the existence of a state of war at the time, 46 and they maintained many outward manifestations of peaceful status.
43 Id. at 48-49.
44 Id.
at 51.
45 Id.
at 54. As a result of the sanctions imposed under Article 16, Italy announced that
she did not consider herself bound by a number of the agreements she had entered into prior
to the Ethiopian affair. Compare Letter from Italian Government to Secretary-Generalof
the League Council, LEAGUE OF NArIONS OFF.J. (pt. II 16th Ass. 1627 (C. 418 /M. 212)
(1935), with LEAGuE OF NATIONS OFF.J. (pt. 1) 16th Ass. 1137 (1935). During the course of
League consideration of the Italo-Ethiopian situation, the Italian representative, Baron
Aloisi, often relied on the treaties between Italy and Ethiopia, and third powers, to justify
Italy's actions. Id. at 34; Wright, The Test of Aggression in the Italo-Ethiopian War, 30 AM.
J.INT'L L. 45, 53 (1936).
46 HNDMARSH, op. cit. supra note 5, at 129.
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The Nine Power Treaty, 47 to which both Japan and China were signatories,
was one of the series of political alliances resulting from the Washington Conference of 1921. The contracting parties agreed to respect "the sovereignty,
the independence, and the territorial and administrative integrity of China."
In 1931 Japan occupied Manchuria as part of her national policy of bringing
about a "new order" in Asia.
The United States early in 1932 indicated to the Japanese and Chinese
Governments that it considered the Nine Power Treaty in full force and
effect. 48 Secretary of State Stimson asserted that:
[1]t is clear beyond peradventure that a situation has developed which cannot, under any circumstances, be reconciled with the obligations of the
covenants of these two treaties; and that if the treaties had been faithfully
observed such a situation could not have arisen. The signatories of the
Nine Power Treaty and of the Kellogg-Briand Pact who are not parties to
that conflict are not likely to see any reasons for modifying the terms of
those treaties. 49
The Japanese Government did not deny the continued validity of the treaty,
but argued that its action in China was a measure of self-defense.50 It considered the treaty outmoded, but not abrogated.51 The other signatories appeared
to agree that the treaty was in force but asserted that Japan was not living up
to her obligations under it.52
These events are significant when placed in the context of a political rather
than a commercial treaty in which the effect of hostilities is not necessarily
incompatible with performance of the obligations imposed. It has been observed that the commercial treaties concluded among the powers with interests
in the Far East were not affected by the Japanese aggressions. 53 Placed in
context, the use of coercion by Japan represented an attempt to modify the
status quo in the Far East in order to secure for itself a larger share of power. 54
The very actions proscribed by the Nine Power Treaty were the actions which
47 44 Stat. 2113 (signed Feb. 5, 1922, effective Aug. 5, 1925).
48 1 FOREIGN RELATIONS OF UNITED STATES, JAPAN: 1931-1941, pp. 76, 83-87 (1943)
(hereinafter cited as FOR. REL., JAPAN).
4
9 Letter from Secretary of State Stimson to Senator Borah, Chairman of the Sen.
Comm. on Foreign Relations, Feb. 23, 1932, id. at 85, 376.
50 1 FOR. REL., JAPAN 400, 411; McINnR 58; II FoR. REL., JAPAN 764.

511 FOR. REL., JAPAN 400, 410; I FOR. REL., JAPAN 754.
52 McINYRE 58; Declaration Adopted by Nine Power Conference at Brussels, Nov. 15,
1937, 17 Dept. of State Press Releases No. 425, Nov. 20, 1937. For similar statements by
League committees, see I FOR. REL., JAPAN 394, 399.
53 WRIGHT, LEGAL PROBLEMS IN THE FAR EASTERN CoNFLicr 112 (1941).

54 McDougal & Feliciano, The Initiation of Coercion: A Multi-Temporal Analysis, 52
Am. J. INT'L L. 241, 248-49 (1958).
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Japan undertook; hence there exists no reasonable ground for asserting that
this political alliance was suspended temporarily; similarly, a claim that the
treaty was abrogated by the hostilities would of necessity be a unilateral determination opposed by the remaining signatories.
In the context of a power struggle a state may advance varying, and sometimes conflicting, legal justifications for political and military actions it is determined to take for various unrelated internal economic or political reasons.
The actions of Japan with respect to the Nine Power Treaty may be so characterized. While officially taking various legal positions-i.e., that the treaty
was outmoded, inapplicable to a purely Sino-Japanese matter, and had been
violated by its opposing belligerent-her representatives in informal diplomatic discussion admitted that promises under the treaty had been broken.
They maintained that the aggressive actions of the government were compelled
by the demands of certain internal political factions.55
The officials of other States, however, recognized that Japan had ignored
the treaty56 and gave their understanding of the legal situation as one "where
one party to an international treaty maintains against the views of all the other
parties that the action which it has taken does not come within the scope of
that treaty, and sets aside provisions of the treaty which the other parties hold
to be operative in the circumstances."57 In 1937, the League of Nations indicated that Japan had violated the Nine Power Treaty and could not justify her
actions on legal grounds,58 but failed to employ enforcement measures against
her.
It may be concluded that when a state ignores the obligations of a multilateral political alliance by employing force, the treaty may be said technically
to have remained in effect as to the remaining parties, but since its purpose
was preservation of a political status quo, such a conclusion would appear to
be of small comfort to anyone.s 9
3. The Effect of the Approach of War: 1939-1941.-The outbreak of war
in Europe in 1939 presented many legal problems to the United States since,
on the one hand, its long-established attitude of isolation from European
political affairs had resulted in an elaborate complex of internal neutrality
5 1 FOR. REL., JAPAN 88.
56 I id. at 55.
Declaration Adopted by Nine Power Conference, supra note 39.
5
3 LEAGuE OF NATIONS OFF. J., 18th Ass., Spec. Supp. No. 117, at 42 (1937); I FOR. REL.,
JAPAN 394; WRIGHT, op. cit. supra note 53, at 107.
59 The question of revival of the ignored obligation is not relevant to a treaty of political
alliance designed to preserve a status quo. It has been pointed out that treaties providing
for membership in international unions were, however, not affected by the conflict. WRIGHT,
57

op. cit. supra note 53, at 107-08. As to the binding nature of the Pact of Paris during the

course of the Far Eastern conflict, see id. at 98-100.
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legislation, 60 and, on the other hand, the Roosevelt Administration had slowly
adopted a policy of supplying considerable aid to the allies short of entering
the war. 61 During the years 1939-1941, this policy brought about many
controversial interpretations of internal legislation in order to implement a
62
policy of partisan neutrality.
The increasingly intense hostile actions of the Axis Powers caused the
United States to seek avoidance of international obligations that restricted
its policy of aid to the belligerents with whom its sympathies lay. The Administration desired to escape the tonnage limitations on vessels, particularly oil
tankers, imposed by the International Load Lines Convention. 63 The then
Acting Attorney General of the United States relied upon the absence of normal peacetime relations, which he asserted were a basic condition on which
the convention was founded, to advise President Franklin Roosevelt that the
treaty could be suspended by the United States even though, as to it, a state
of war did not exist. 64 His opinion stated:
In short, the implicit assumption of normal peacetime international trade,
which is at the foundation of the Load Line Convention, no longer exists.
... The fundamental character of the change in conditions underlying the
treaty, however, leaves the Government of the United States entirely free
to declare the treaty inoperative or to suspend it for the duration of the
65
present emergency.
The technical rule of international law cited as a justification for the action
was the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus,66 since the traditional rule of treaty
abrogation on the occurrence of war was not factually available. Interestingly,
the opinion gave the President a choice: suspension or termination. It is questionable whether rebus sic stantibus can logically produce a result other than
60 DEENER, THE UNITED STATES ATrORNEys GENERAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 358-62

(1957); PADELFORD, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND DIPLOMACY IN THE SPANISH STRIFE (1939);
Jessup, The Neutrality Act of 1939, 34 Am. J. INr'L L. 95 (1940).
61
DBNER, op. cit. supra note 60, at 360; BuRNs, RoosEvELT: THE LION AND THE Fox
(1956); 2 THE MEMOIRS OF CORDELL HULL 1046 (1948).
62 39 Ops. Arr'y GEN. 484 (1940) (destroyers-for-bases exchange with Great Britain);
39 Ops. ATr'y GEN. 402 (1939); 39 Ops. Arr'y GEN. 539 (1940); 40 Ops. Ar'y GEN. 135
(1941); 40 Ops. Arr'y GEN. 130 (1941); 39 Ors. Arr'Y GEN. 337 (1939); 40 Ops. Arr'y
GmN. 58 (1941).
63 47 Stat. 2228 (1933); BENDnER, THE RIDDLE OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT 190 (1942);
DEENER, op. cit. supra note 60, at 142.
6440 Ops. ATr'y GEN. 119 (1941).
65

Id. at 121, 123.

66 For criticism of the use of this doctrine under the circumstances, see Briggs, The
Attorney General Invokes Rebus Sic Stantibus, 36 AM. 3. INT'L L. 89 (1942). It has been
noted that the Legal Adviser of the State Department objected to the unilateral nature of
this suspension of a treaty. DEENER, op. cit. supra note 60, at 142, 360. However, the President did secure the agreement of the American states which were parties to the Convention.
5 DEP'T STATE BULL. 114 (1941).
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complete termination. The President chose to proclaim the suspension of the
convention 67 for the duration of the emergency, 68 and upon cessation of hostilities announced that it was once more binding upon the United States. 69
IV.

THE SITUATION UNDER THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS

In the major armed conflicts that have taken place since World War II
formal declarations of war have not been issued. The prospects are that this
tendency will continue. The Charter of the United Nations is not dependent
on a finding of a "resort to war" by a state in order to activate its peaceprotecting machinery. To a large extent the doctrine of legal, or justifiable,
war has been outlawed in the international community. 70 The Charter directs
7
itself to "threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression." 1
In a sense, past concern over the effect of war on treaties may be said to be

obsolete. Of course, many of the concepts employed in that inquiry are directly analogous and, provisionally at least, authoritative as to the conse67 6 Fed. Reg. 3999.
68 McINTYRE, LEOAL EFscT OF WoRLD WAR II ON TRATIEs oF THE UNrrED STATES 26

(1958) [hereinafter cited as McINTYRE].
69 10 Fed. Reg. 15365. Although not a member of the League of Nations, the United
States appeared to recognize the obligations of collective resistance to actions deemed
aggressive in nature by refusing to allow older concepts of neutrality to prevent assistance
to peaceful states. This attitude was clearly expressed by Attorney General Jackson, who
stated: "Present aggressive wars are civil wars against the international community. Accordingly, as responsible members of the community, we can treat victims of aggression in the
same way we treat legitimate governments when there is civil strife and a state of insurgency
-this is to say, we are permitted to give to defending governments all the aid we choose."
Address delivered to Inter-American Bar Association, Havana, 1941, reprinted in 35 AM.
J. INT'L L. 348, 353 (1941).
70 Clearly the dichotomy between the legal states of war and peace still remains all-important for many non-international purposes. The determination of whether a state of war
exists is made by many different parties for a variety of different purposes and in order to
achieve separate goals. McDougal & Feliciano, supra note 54, at 241. An example of a
commentator who fails to differentiate between the different purposes for which the decision
is made is found in Pye, The Legal Status of the Korean Hostilities,45 GEo. L.J. 45 (1956),
wherein the author concludes on the basis of internal military tribunal decisions and cases
interpreting life insurance policies and statutes of limitations, that the Korean hostilities
"did in fact constitute a state of war.. . ." Id. at 59. He takes issue with Professor Hersch
Lauterpacht, who wrote: "Although hostilities waged for the collective enforcement of
International Law-in particular, of the Charter of the United Nations-are calculated to
exhibit the normal characteristics and manifestations of war, it is probably inaccurate and
undesirable to describe them as war in the accepted sense of the word. Thus when in 1950
the forces of the United Nations were engaged, in pursuance of a decision of the Security
Council, in repelling the invasion of South Korea by North Korea, there was no disposition
on the part of either of the United Nations as a whole or of the participating States to treat
as war in the formal sense of the word what Chapter VII of the Charter describes as enforcement action." 2 OPPENHEM 224. It is believed that Professor Lauterpacht's description of
what takes place under an application of Chapter VII cannot be refuted by a single-purpose
characterization of these same events based on domestic laws, domestic court decisions, and
for the purpose of domestic legal certainty.
71 U.N. CHARTER ch. VIII.
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quences which may be expected from the outbreak of major hostilities no
longer termed war.7 2 Particularly significant is the manner in which the organized international community contemplates dealing with the outbreak of
hostilities it considers a threat to, or breach of, the peace, or an act of aggression. 73
A. Enforcement Measures Initiatedby the Organization.-The Charter of
the United Nations, as originally conceived, placed the responsibility for
maintenance of the peace on the Security Council. Hence, most discussions
on this subject at the San Francisco Conference centered on actions that
might be taken by the Security Council. Under Article 41:
The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of
armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may
call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures.
These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations
and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.
Under Article 42 where the Council concludes that measures not involving
force will not prove, or have not proven, effective,
it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to
maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land
forces of Members of the United Natons.
The question then arises as to what effect the initiation of such unarmed
and armed coercion will have upon existing treaties that impose duties in-

compatible with the measures taken, and also on treaties that in no manner
interfere with the United Nations action.
1. Article 103: The San FranciscoConference.-Among the amendments to
the Dumbarton Oaks proposals submitted by other participating governments
at the San Francisco Conference, Norway proposed as an addition to the section which eventually became Article 41 of the Charter, the following paragraph:
In the relations between members of the organization this obligation [the
taking of diplomatic, economic, or other measures not involving the use of
armed force necessary to give effect to a Security Council decision] takes
precedence over the execution of stipulations contained in commercial or
other treaties; and in their relations with States not members of the Organization, member States should in the manner provided for in such treaties
take steps to regain the necessary freedom of action.74
72

WRIGHT, op. cit. supra note 53, at 92; McDougal & Feliciano, supra note 54, at 241.

73 See Eagleton, The Attempt to Define Aggression, INT'L CONCILATION, No. 264 (1930);
WiGHT, HAGuE AcADEmy LEcruR~s (1959) (definition of aggression).

74 U.N. Doc. No. 289, IJI /3/11, 12 U.N. CONF. INT'L ORG. Docs. 607 (1945).
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The reason advanced by Norway for this addition was that:
The rules of International Law continue to bind States in so far as the
Charter does not derogate from them. An express stipulation seems necessary even if a clause is inserted in the Charter to the effect that all treaties
or treaty clauses incompatible with its terms are annulled as between the
75
members.
The Norwegian Delegate was asked to agree to reserve discussion of this
amendment "until [the Committee on Legal Problems] had acted upon a
broader proposal relative to treaty obligations incompatible with the provisions of the Charter."76 That Committee had been engaged in the drafting of
eventual Article 103, which now provides:
In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the
United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any
other international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter
shall prevail.77
In drafting Article 103, the Committee on Legal Problems (Committee 2)
clearly was aware of the type of problem of conflicting treaty obligations that
might arise from a Security Council request for application of "measures not
involving the use of armed force" pursuant to Article 41. The report of the
Committee explained the type of conflicting obligations foreseen by its suggested text, as follows:
The nature of such a conflict has not been defined, but it would be enough
that a conflict should arise from the carrying out of an obligation of the
Charter. It is immaterial whether the conflict arise because of intrinsic inconsistency between the two categories of obligations or as a result of the
application of the provisions of the Charter under given circumstances:
e.g., in the case where economic sanctions were applied against a state
which derives benefits or advantages from previous agreements contrary
to said sanctions.I8

It must be noted for later inquiry that the reference to economic sanctions is
not specifically limited to Article 41 and hence the Security Council, but it is
in general terms and potentially applicable to the General Assembly.
Of further significance is the interpretation of Article 103 as not providing
for automatic abrogation of conflicting treaties, but rather as requiring that
obligations under the Charter "shall prevail." "Moreover it [the Committee]
75

U.N. Doc. No. 2, G/7 (n)(1), 3 U.N. CON. INr'L ORG. Docs. 371 (1945).
M1/3/24, 12 U.N. CONF. INt'L ORG. Docs. 355 (1945).

76 U.N. Doc. No. 539,

77 The Committee on Enforcement Arrangements later adopted the original language
and deferred the Norwegian amendment on the ground that a broader proposal was being
considered elsewhere. Id. at 431.
78 Report of the Rapporteurof Committee IV2, U.N. Doc. No. 933, IV/2142, 13 U.N.
CoNr. INTL ORG. Docs. 707-08 (1945).
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has decided that it would be inadvisable to provide for the automatic abrogation by the Charter of obligations inconsistent with the terms thereof. It has
been deemed preferable to have the rule depend upon and be linked with the
case of a conflict between the two categories of obligations. In such a case,
the obligations of the Charter would be pre-eminent and would exclude any
others." 79 As to conflicting obligations with non-members of the United
Nations, the Committee was of the opinion that:
In the event of an actual conflict between such obligations and the obligations of members under the Charter, particulary in matters affecting peace
and security, the latter may have to prevail. The Committee is fully aware
that as a matter of international law it is not ordinarily possible to provide
in any convention for rules binding upon third parties. On the other hand,
it is of the highest importance for the Organization that the performance
of the members' obligations under the Charter in specific cases should not
be hindered by obligations which they may have assumed to non-member
States.... The suggested text is accordingly not limited to pre-existing
obligations between members.80
2. The Security Council.-In view of the history of the Norwegian suggestion, the context in which Article 103 was created, and the specific language
of the Report of Committee 3, there appears little question that existing treaty
obligations between member states inconsistent with enforcement measures
taken pursuant to a Security Council decisions' need not be observed by cooperating member states. This opinion is supported by writers.82 The reference
to factual consequences in Article 103 leads to the conclusion that inconsistent
agreements do not ipso facto come to an end, but that the inconsistent performance required under their terms is temporarily excused. The formula
employed evidences no intent to terminate such treaties, but rather the desire
to avoid the hindering requirements of their terms. It is presumed that upon
cessation of the emergency situation their terms, if no longer inconsistentwith
Charter obligations, would be once more binding. However, revival of the ob79 Id. at 707.

so Id. at 708 (emphasis added); for the Subcommittee Reports, see id. at 805-07, 811-13.
81 A Security Council decision plainly creates a legal obligation by virtue of Article 25.
5

8 Jessup states that "under Article 41 of the Charter of the United Nations the Security
Council may call upon the Members to apply such measures as complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of international communications, and the Members are
under a duty to comply. It cannot be doubted that action taken by a Member in compliance
with such directions of the Security Council would constitute justification for any incidental
breach of a treaty obligation calling for freedom of commercial intercourse or of communications." JEsstr, A MODERN LAW Or NATIONS 153 (1948). GooDRicI- & HANokO, CHARTER
oF THE UNrrED NATIONS 278 (1949), notes that "it may happen that... other international
agreements such as trade agreements and postal conventions will be violated by the action
required to give effect to the Council's decision [under Article 41].... The... situation is
squarely faced by the Charter. Article 103 provides that in case of conflict between the
obligations of Members under the Charter and under international agreements, the former
will prevail."
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ligations would afford a complaining state no legal claim arising from damage
caused by the previously suspended performance.
As to treaties with non-members, it is also believed that when their obligations conflict with legal duties created by Security Council decisions under the
Charter, such obligations become legally inoperative.8 3 This principle is accurate to the extent that adoption of the Charter, and in particular Article 2(6),
created a new international law for the world community, which all states,
non-members as well as members, must respect. The position taken by the
framers of Article 103 toward non-members is considerably stronger than the
attitude of the League toward the same problem, possibly due to the almost
universal membership of the United Nations.
A significant problem with the Charter formula lies in the determination
of when a "conflict" between the two sets of obligations arises. Noteworthy
is the decision taken at San Francisco not to assign this task to any particular
organ of the organization. The problem raised by absence of interpretation by
a supra-national organization is one beyond the scope of this paper. However,
it is significant for present purposes that "conflicting" or "inconsistent" obligations are used as the touchstone. The inference may be drawn that those
treaties that in no way are inconsistent with the measures taken under the
Charter remain unaffected by the occurrence of hostile acts. Thus, a causal
link is required between the use of coercion and the excuse from treaty performance. Under the old doctrine that "war ipso facto abrogates treaties,"
no necessary connection existed between the two events. It has been suggested
that only from the repeated simultaneous occurrence of coercion and excuse
from treaties was the general rule as to abrogation deduced.84 The evolution
of the "abrogates some, suspends some, leaves others intact" rule was basically
founded on the rational connection requirement of Judge Cardozo's "incompatibility" doctrine in Techt v. Hughes.85 Thus the Charter has expanded the
applicability of the rational connection test.
3. The General Assembly.-The recent difficulties of the Security Council
as keeper of the peace have directed attention toward the powers of the General Assembly.8 6 The absence of the Soviet representative from the Security
Council upon the outbreak of the Korean hostilities allowed the Council to
initiate enforcement measures and to recommend to members the use of
armed force to resist aggression. With the return of the U.S.S.R. to the Council, the General Assembly passed the Uniting for Peace Resolutions and
others, which allowed it to direct the major efforts of the United Nations
throughout the crisis. 87
83 See JESStuP, op. cit. supra note 82, at 153.

84 2 HYDE § 547.

85 229 N.Y. 222, 128 N.E. 185 (1920), cert. denied,254 U.S. 643 (1920).
86
Vallat, The Competence of the UnitedNations GeneralAssembly, 97 RECuEL DES COURS
207, 246, 250-51 (1959).
87 Id. at 258-67.
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By a resolution entitled "Intervention of the Central People's Government
of the People's Republic of China in Korea," the General Assembly called
upon "all States and authorities to continue to lend every assistance to the
United Nations action in Korea"; and also called upon "all States and
authorities to refrain from giving any assistance to the aggressors in Korea." 88
The General Assembly further recommended8 9 that every state apply an
embargo on shipment of military and strategic materials to areas under North
Korean or Communist Chinese control, co-operate with other states in carrying out the embargo, and report to the Additional Measures Committee on the
steps taken. Soviet Russia and Poland had unsuccessfully contended that the
question of embargo came under Chapter VII and, therefore, that it was the
duty of the General Assembly under Article 11(2) to refer the matter to the
Security Council, especially since the sanctions were in reality Article 41
measures. 90

These events raise the question of the effect on treaties produced by a recommendation of the General Assembly rather than by a decision of the
Security Council.
4. Backgroundof the Economic Measures Taken in Korea.-In preparing a
report for the General Assembly, the Collective Measures Committee, established by the Uniting for Peace Resolution, 91 discussed subcommittee reports
concerning the effect of collective measures on the legal obligations of states. 92
Its Subcommittee on Economic and Financial Measures had concluded that
states should not be subject to legal liabilities under other treaties as a result
of carrying out United Nations collective measures. The report of the Subcommittee for the Study of Political Measures had merely noted that the possible effects, under Article 103, of recommendations or decisions of UN
organs could be dealt with only in the light of the circumstances surrounding
individual cases. 93 In discussing the language to be adopted, the United
States representative explained that the Economic and Financial Measures
8s 1 REPERTORY OF UNITED NATIONS PRACrIcE 50 (1955). The Moscow Agreement of
1945, designed to ensure the independence of Korea, was invoked in the attempt to preclude

discussion of the Korean question by the General Assembly on the ground that it was a
treaty concerned with liquidating the consequences of World War II and hence beyond the
competence of the Assembly under Article 107. The opposing argument asserted that the
General Assembly was not precluded by Article 107 but should take the Moscow Agreement
into consideration in determining the future of Korea. Action was taken by the General
Assembly despite continued objection by the U.S.S.R., Poland, and Czechoslovakia. See 5
id. at 388-89.
9 Resolution 500(V), U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. REc. 5th Sess., Supp. No. 20, at 2 (A/1775/
Add. 1) (1951); adopted May 18, 1951, by 47 votes to none, with eight abstentions.
90 1 REPERTORY OF UNITED NATIONS PIRAcTIc
91

324 (1955).

Resolution 377(V), U.S. GEN. Ass. OFF. R c. 5th Sess., Supp. No. 20, at 10 (A /1775)

(1950).
92
Collective Measures Committee, Summary Record, U.N. Doc. No. A /AC. 43/SR. 6

(1951).
93 Tbid.
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Subcommittee intended that a state should not be held responsible for treaty
violations resulting from the application of collective measures recommended
by either the Security Council or the General Assembly.94 He pointed out that
the report had not simply relied upon Article 103 because there was some
question whether that article applied to recommendationsof the Security Council and the General Assembly as well as to decisions of those organs.9 5 But,
he continued, the Subcommittee had chosen its language in the light of the
Article 103 problem and had desired to introduce the principle into international law if it did not already exist.9 6
The opposing view, expressed by the representative of Belgium, was that
unless Article 103 was invoked the General Assembly and the Security Council should not adopt resolutions that the members could not implement
without violating their contractual obligations. 97 He also noted the danger of
a general statement that would not take into consideration "the fact that
Article 103 could not apply to legal obligations assumed in respect of nonMember states."98
Following a discussion in which it was pointed out that the wiser course
was to avoid direct reference to the primacy of Security Council and General
Assembly recommendations over conflicting treaty obligations,99 the Committee adopted the following language:
In the event of a decision or recommendation of the United Nations to
undertake collective measures, the following guiding principles should be
given full consideration by the Security Council or the General Assembly
and by States:
It is of importance that States should not be subjected to legal liabilities
under treaties or other international agreements as a consequence of carrying out United Nations collective measures. 00
The General Assembly took note of this report and its conclusions in a resolution' 01 that led to the undertaking of economic measures in Korea.
There thus appears to be general agreement that the implementation of collective measures, whether authorized by recommendation or decision, should
not be hampered by the concern of states with possible violation of other international obligations. 102 However, while attempting to insure that collec94 Id. at 7.
95 Id. at 8.

96 Ibid.
97 Id. at 7.

98 Ibid.

99 Collective Measures Committee, Summary Record, U.N. Doc. No. A /AC. 43/SR. 8,

at 2-3 (1951).
100 Collective Measures Committee, Report, U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. RUc. 6th Sess., Supp.
No. 13, at 33 (A/1891) (1951). (Emphasis added.)
101 Resolution 503A(VI), U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. REc. 6th Sess., Supp. No. 20, at 2 (A/2119)
(1952).
102 In this connection it is also helpful to recall the conclusions of the Legal Subcommittee in the Italo-Ethiopian dispute. See text accompanying note 43 supra.
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tive measures may be carried out with minimal difficulty, member states are
very reluctant to suggest that recommendations of the organization have
compulsory legal effect. That they are not without some legal effect would,
103
however, seem difficult to deny.
On this question, the opinion of Judge Lauterpacht in the South-West
Africa-Voting Procedurecase merits particular attention:
It would be wholly inconsistent with sound principles of interpretation as
well as with highest international interest, which can never be legally irrelevant, to reduce the value of the Resolutions of the General Assembly-one
of the principal instrumentalities of the formation of the collective will and
judgment of the community of nations represented by the United Nations
-and to treat them, for the purpose of this Opinion and otherwise, as
nominal, insignificant and having no claim to influence the conduct of the
Members. International interest demands that no judicial support, however
indirect, be given to any such conception of the Resolutions of the General
Assembly as being of no consequence. 104
The proper approach to the nature of Assembly recommendations has been
ably summarized by F. A. Vallat, Deputy Legal Adviser to the British Foreign
Office:
Whether the Assembly is entitled to make legal acts which would otherwise be breaches of a treaty is a moot point, but there is always likely to be
a strong presumption that action taken by a State in accordance with a
recommendation of the General Assembly is lawful. The legal effect of a
resolution in this respect may be of the greatest significance in the context
of the maintenance of peace and security, if the Security Council fails to
take any action to deal with a breach of the peace, and the Assembly recommends measures, for the purpose of restoring the peace, to be taken by
Member States against one and in support of the other party to the conflict.105

B. State-InitiatedActs of Aggression.-Although the main concern here is
with the effects produced on treaties by collective enforcement measures,
some brief observations should be made concerning the Charter and stateinitiated acts of aggression or coercion.
By virtue of Article 2, paragraphs 3 and 4, of the Charter, members of the
United Nations are enjoined against the threat or use of force in the settlement

of international disputes. The use of force by a state against a member, in
violation of the Charter and before the organization can take responsive action, makes permissible retaliatory measures in the exercise of the "right" of
103 Vallat notes that: "To say that recommendations of the General Assembly are not
as a rule binding on States, does not mean that they are of no legal effect whatever." Vallat,
supra note 86, at 231.
104 [1955] I.C.J. Rep. 67, 122 (separate opinion of Lauterpacht, J.).
10s Vallat, supra note 86, at 231.
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self-defense.106 For an innocent state a clearly legitimate measure would be to
suspend obligations that were inconsistent with the right of self-defense. The
question subject to later review by a third-party decision-making organ would
be twofold: whether the initial use of force was a violation of the Charter, and
whether non-performance of the treaty was a reasonable measure taken in the
exercise of the right of self-defense. This privilege of non-performance would
apply as well against non-members rendering assistance to an aggressor. The
same reasoning would apply to non-performance of treaties with (1) a nonmember state that initiated coercion, and (2) non-member states rendering
assistance to the peccant state, under the authority of Articles 2 (6) and 103.
Few instances have come to attention where treaty obligations have been
affected by state-initiated coercion during the life of the United Nations. The
Suez situation is, however, worthy of mention. Following the Egyptian revolt
of 1952, Great Britain and Egypt concluded the Suez Canal Base Agreement
of 1954107 providing for withdrawal of British forces from Egypt within
twenty months. The agreement, which was intended to endure for seven
years, provided that in the event of attack on any member of the Arab League
by an outside power, excluding Israel,108 Egypt would allow the return of
British forces to the Suez Canal Base. Subsequent to Egyptian nationalization of the Suez Canal Company, and the Israeli attack on Egypt, 109 Britain
and France launched an aerial bombardment on November 1, 1956, and shortly thereafter landed armed forces. On termination of hostilities the parties to
the dispute entered into a series of agreements" 0 to settle their differences.
Egypt later asserted that the British attack of 1956 violated the 1954 Base
Agreement, and relieved her of its obligations;11 by decree of January 1,
1957, Egypt denounced the treaty." 2 This decree rested upon the doctrine
that breach by one state of the terms of an agreement affords the non-culpable
state the right of denunciation. If the doctrine was correctly applied, the
treaty came to an end because of the violation of its terms, rather than because
of an inconsistency between its performance and the hostilities. It is therefore
difficult to draw relevant conclusions from the incident. However, among the
settlement documents agreed to by the parties in 1959 was the Anglo-Egyptian
Agreement1 3 designed to re-establish normal relations, whereby the parties
106 U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
107 210 U.N.T.S. 3, 24 (No. 2833, 1955).
108 Mostofi, The Suez Dispute, 10 WESTERN POL.

Q. 23, 35 (1957).

109 Oct. 29, 1956.

110 See THE SuEz CANAL SETrLEMENT-A SELEcrION OF Docu,.mErs (Lauterpacht ed.

1960).
11 Mostofi, supra note 108, at 37.
112 Termination was recorded by the United Nations Secretariat June 12, 1957. 269

U.N.T.S. 566 (No. 2833, 1957).
113 Reprinted in THE Susz CANAL SErlEmB.Err, op. cit. supra note 110, at 48-59.
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agreed that a pre-existing commercial agreement between them "shall be
deemed to be in force as from the date of the signature of the present Agreement."11 4 As in the situation that arose on termination of the 1902 Venezuelan
blockade,"5 the parties were apparently unsure as to the legal effects of the
hostilities upon the treaty. It is believed that in order to remove any doubts
as to its binding character, they resorted to the familiar formula that the
agreement shall be "deemed" in force.
As indicated at the outset, the United States, in breaking diplomatic relations with Cuba, asserted that the action had no effect upon its treaty rights
with respect to the Guantanamo Naval Base. In view of the membership of
both countries in the United Nations, the diminishing legal effect of measures
short of war on treaties, and the absence of any incompatibility between performance of obligations under that treaty and the severance of diplomatic
relations, it would appear that the American position is well-founded.
V.

CONCLUSIONS

It might have been expected that measures short of war would bring about
legal consequences proportionately less than those caused by war in the technical sense of the word. This has proven to be the case. No instance has been
discovered where measures short of war abrogated a treaty solely because of
the occurrence of the measures themselves," 6 although often the performance
117
required by a treaty will be ignored by a state involved in hostilities.
The general rule which began emerging during the pre-League yearsduring the ascendancy and decline of the "war ipso facto abrogates all
treaties" doctrine-was that measures short of war would rarely, if ever, abrogate a treaty, but rather would suspend its application, or more commonly,
merely suspend performance of certain of its obligations. After cessation of
hostilities, the treaty, or its obligations, would once more be binding either
automatically, or upon announced revival.
While the language of Article 20 of the League Covenant referred to abrogation of conflicting agreements, the practice of the League, and its interpretations of Article 16, did not support the ipso facto rule as to abrogation of
treaties.
The adoption of the Charter, with its non-recognition of war in the formal
sense, and the formula of Article 103, extend the potential treaty-effects of a
114 Id. at 56-57 Annex D (1). This treaty, the Provisional Commercial Agreement of
June 5-7, 1930, had been renewed by an exchange of notes of October 19, 1952, and was by
its terms to remain in force indefinitely, subject only to a provision for abrogation on three
months notice. 158 U.N.T.S. 423 (No. 2075, 1953).
11

s See text accompanying notes 18-24 supra.

116 Alleged violations of the terms of a political or military agreement was the reason
given for denouncing the Suez Base Agreement. See text accompanying notes 111-12 supra.

117 E.g., Nine Power Treaty, 44 Stat. 2113 (1922). See text, Section flI(B)2, supra.
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resort to hostilities. The pattern of the Charter is to legitimize the co-operation
of a state with collective enforcement measures when the action required involves non-compliance with inconsistent treaty terms. The concern is not only
to facilitate the enforcement measures, but also to minimize the disruption of
existing international relationships to the greatest possible extent; the result
has been the disappearance of the abrogation formula.
Few generalizations that have not already been made in commentaries on
the effects of war 1 S can be made as to the types of treaties most affected by the
incidence of hostile acts. It is believed that for the most part certain bilateral
technical, administrative and commercial agreements are less affected by hostilities than treaties of a more political or military nature. The same may be
said for international multilateral agreements on technical subjects. However,
further generalizations do not appear appropriate. State officials react to particular crises with a concern for immediate practicalities and a tendency to
disregard accepted doctrinal generalizations.
With the further turning away from traditional conceptions of war has
come a realization of the greater need for stability of international agreements
-technical, commercial and political-in order to minimize the disruptive effects of therecurring outbreak of hostilities. This realization has been demonstrated over the years in the pragmatic approach of states seeking to minimize
the legal effects of hostile acts.
118 See McNThRyE at Conclusions, and literature cited on that subect in notes 7-9 supra.

